We propose a framework, called OM pairs, for the formalization of metareasoning. OM pairs allow us to generate deductively pairs composed of an object theory and a metatheory related via a so called reflection principle. This is done by imposing, via appropriate reflection rules, the relation we want to hold between the object theory and the metatheory. In this paper we concentrate on the proof theory of OM pairs. We study them from various points of view: we compare the strength of the object theory and the metatheories generated by different combination of reflection rules; for each combination we characterize the object theory and metatheory, both axiomatically (when possible), and by means of fix-point equations. Finally we present four important case studies.
Introduction
The 'Meta' property is not a property which can be ascribed to a single theory; it is rather a relation between two theories. A theory is said to be meta of another, not necessarily distinct, theory if it is about this other theory. The latter theory is often said to be the object of the former theory. To be about the object theory, the metatheory is defined starting from a language, called the metalanguage, that contains special formulas, called metaformulas, that represent properties of the object theory. Examples of properties which are often considered are: 'being a variable (of the object theory)', 'being a term', 'being a formula', 'a variable occurring free in a formula', 'a formula being the result of substituting a term for all free occurrences of a variable in another formula', 'being a theorem', 'a formula being derivable from a set of formulas', 'a formula being (in)consistent with respect to a set of formulas', 'a formula being true in a model of the object theory', and so on.
Let us analyse in more detail the meaning of the statement 'the metatheory is about the object theory'. Intuitively a theory is a metatheory of an object theory if the truth of metaformulas in the metatheory implies the holding of the corresponding properties of the object theory. Formally, in order to say that a theory is meta of another, one should provide some formal framework to describe the object theory and the metatheory, and provide a statement, either in, or on such a framework, which corresponds to the intuitive statement above. In the literature, these kinds of statements are often called reflection principles [12] . A reflection principle for an object theory Ç is an assertion, either formal or informal, stating the correctness of the metatheory w.r.t. the object theory. In other words, a reflection principle is a (possibly formalized version of a) statement of the following form:
If the statement is provable in a formal system Ë then holds (1.1) Many other different reflection principles, similar to (1.1), can be found in the literature; see [18, 20] and [6] for a survey. The formalization of a reflection principle involves at least the three main aspects, namely: the language, the role, and the strength of the reflection principle itself. Let us analyse these three aspects in detail.
First, notice that (1.1) is an implication, where the premiss is representable in the metalanguage of Ç, and the consequence is representable in Ç itself (as a matter of fact, it is itself). Statement (1.1) involves, however, a third (formal or informal) language, namely the language where (1.1) itself is stated. Depending on the choice of the languages where the premiss, the conclusion and the statement itself is formulated we have different approaches. Examples where the object theory and the metatheory coincide and the reflection principle is stated in the same language are [12, 32, 6] (in formal logic) and [27, 28] (in Artificial Intelligence). In other approaches the object theory and the metatheory coincide but the reflection principle is stated externally to them, by means of a set of inference rules. In this case we have an informal representation of (1.1) which is not a formula in a formal system. Such examples are the linking rules defined in [8] (in Metalogic Programming) and the reflection rule of the FOL system [36] . Its clear that, if the object theory and the metatheory are completely distinct, then (1.1) cannot be stated in any of the two theories. Examples of such approaches are [36, 17] (in Artificial Intelligence) and [21, 22] 
(in Metalogic Programming).
A second observation about (1.1) concerns its role, namely, how and to which purpose the reflection principle is used. A first possibility is that (1.1) has a descriptive role. This means that (1.1) is a statement that is true for a specific pair of object and metatheory. In this case the problem is to construct an object theory and a metatheory that meet the reflection principle. A second possibility is that (1.1) has a generative role. This means that the reflection principle, usually formalized as a set of axioms or a set of inference rules, is exploited to generate the object theory and the metatheory in the relation expressed by the reflection principle itself. Examples of the first approach can be found in the area of Formal Logics [12, 32, 6] , Logic Programming [9] , and Artificial Intelligence [27, 28] . Examples of reflection principle with a generative role can be found in the area of Artificial Intelligence [36, 17, 2, 26] .
The third and last observation about (1.1) concerns its strength. A reflection principle can be stated for a single formula. This is the case, for instance, of the consistency statement where is the contradictory formula . The same reflection principle can be stated for a restricted class of formulas, such as, for instance, the class of closed formulas (local reflection principle), the class of formulas of a certain complexity in the arithmetical hierarchy (partial reflections), the class of formulas which do not contain negation, and so on. In the area of Formal Logics, but also in Artificial Intelligence, one can find many results about the characterization of different reflection principles (see [6] for a survey).
Due to the heterogeneity on languages, roles and strength one can hardly compare, reuse, or compose the many different approaches. The goal of this paper is to provide a logical framework capable of representing all the different approaches by explicitly modelling the three aspects described above, namely: reflection principles in single and multiple theories; descriptive vs. generative role of the reflection principles; and finally, different forms of reflection principles.
Our work plan is as follows. We start by introducing a class of formal systems called Object-Meta pairs (OM pairs), which are composed of an object theory and a metatheory, connected by some reflection principle. To this extent we introduce a set of inference rules, called Reflection Rules (RR) that formally represent the most common reflection principles, and that can be used to derive facts by reasoning across the two theories (Section 2). For each meaningful combination of RRs, we study how the metatheory and the object theory are affected (Sections 3-5). We finally provide three case studies (Section 6), and compare OM pairs with the existing literature (Section 7). The core analysis of OM pairs is organized in three main steps. First, in Section 3, we compare the effects of different sets of reflection rules. We perform this analysis by comparing the strength of the derivability and provability relations generated. Second, in Section 4 we study the absolute strength of the OM pairs we consider. We show that certain combinations of reflection rules generate a metatheory that is also obtainable with the addition of well-known metatheoretic axiom schemata. We also show that there are certain combinations of reflection rules for which such a set of axioms does not exist. Most interestingly, we show that this is the case for one of the most common and natural reflection principles. Finally, in Section 5 we define a notion of duality on reflection principles, which allows us to extend the results proved in the previous sections to new sets of reflection rules. Throughout the paper we consider OM pairs with propositional object theory and metatheory, but in Section 6.4 we generalize our analysis to OM pairs with firstorder object and metatheories.
OM pairs

The intuition
We start from two arbitrary theories Ç and Å, presented as axiomatic formal systems, i.e. Ç Ä Ç ª Ç ¡ Ç and Å Ä Å ª Å ¡ Å . Ç is called the object theory, Å is called the metatheory. Ä Ç (Ä Å ) is the language of Ç (Å ), ª Ç (ª Å ) is the set of axioms of Ç (Å ), and ¡ Ç (¡ Å ) is the deductive machinery (set of inference rules) of Ç (Å ). Metaformulas, namely formulas of Ä Å which refer to some property of Ç, are usually written using standard notation and exploiting two key features of the metalanguage. The first is the ability to refer to, or name, elements of the object theory, e.g. variables, terms, formulas, theorems, sets of formulas. One way to obtain this is by adding to the metalanguage a set of constants, often called names, such that for each name there is a corresponding element of the object theory. Notationally, we write names by surrounding the corresponding element with double quotes. Thus, for instance, is the name of the sentential constant . The second feature is the existence of a distinguished predicate, or metapredicate, written as "¯", which, intuitively, represents, in the metatheory, a corresponding object level property. Thus, for instance, ifī s unary, then the intuition is that the holding of the metaformula¯´ µ is dependent on the holding of of the property being represented.
O and M , are the derivability relations defined by Ç and Å, respectively; ÌÀ´Çµ and ÌÀ´Åµ are the set of theorems of Ç and Å respectively. We then consider a new kind of inter-theory inference rules, called bridge rules [14] , whose premisses and conclusions FIGURE 1. Meta and object theories deductively generated inside an OM pair belong to different languages. Thus we may have a bridge rule with premisses in Ä Ç and conclusion in Ä Å ; and, vice versa, a bridge rule with premisses in Ä Å and conclusion in Ä Ç . Bridge rules extend deductively ÌÀ´Çµ and ÌÀ´Åµ, that is, new object theorems and metatheorems may be proved by applying bridge rules. The set of theorems of the metatheory may be extended whenever the set of theorems of the object theory is extended, and vice versa.
The intuitions underlying the use of bridge rules are the following:
1. A bridge rule (or a set of bridge rules) states a link between the holding of an object level property and the holding of a corresponding metaformula, namely, it states a basic Meta property. 1 Sets of bridge rules, state multiple Meta properties which, in some cases, may result in interesting global Meta properties.
2. A bridge rule, or a set of bridge rules, may be applied deductively and may generate otherwise unprovable meta and object theorems. The extra meta and object theorems are exactly those facts which must hold for the desired Meta property to hold. This idea is exemplified in Figure 1 Notice that this is somewhat opposite to what is the usual approach, where one directly defines meta and object theory (in some cases, e.g. PA, the object theory is expressive enough to be its own metatheory); and then verifies that the metatheory actually satisfies the desired metaproperty. In the 'standard' approach the process of generation of the metatheory is left implicit in the mind of the person defining it, while here the metatheory is deductively synthesized by imposing the desired metaproperty via bridge rules. Our approach makes explicit the process of (object theory and) metatheory generation and, therefore, allows us to tune its parameters so that various, possibly very different, metatheories are generated.
The key step for our approach to be fruitful is that of defining 'interesting' bridge rules. In principle any bridge rule is fine. However, in practice there are constraints that must be satisfied. First, each bridge rule should impose a basic metaproperty whose meaning is intuitively clear, and possibly simple. Second, bridge rules should allow for the definition of metatheories with 'interesting' global metaproperties. For instance they should allow us to define metatheories about provability, about derivability, about truth, and so on. Third, bridge rules should satisfy some (weak) criterion of minimality. That is, it should not be the case that a bridge rule can be trivially expressed as a combination of the others. We therefore focus on the following bridge rules:
For each of the bridge rule above, we consider two versions, the unrestricted version, which can be applied with no restriction and the restricted version (denoted by adding the index Ö ),
which can be applied under the following condition:
RESTRICTIONS: Rules labeled with index Ö are applicable if the premiss does not depend on any assumptions in the same theory. We call the above bridge rules, reflection rules, thus extending the terminology which can be found in the literature [36, 8, 18] . The ÊÙÔ rules are called reflection up rules, the Ê Û rules, reflection down rules. The rules with the Ö are called restricted, the others unrestricted; the rules with the Ò are called negative, the others positive.
Let us argue that our reflection rules meet the criteria described above. As shown in the rest of the paper, reflection rules allow us to define metatheories with interesting global Meta properties. Minimality and simplicity of the reflection rules is also true. In particular, the rules listed above are all natural variations of ÊÙÔ and Ê Û, the two reflection rules mainly studied in the literature (see again [36, 8, 18] ). ÊÙÔ Ö and Ê Û Ö link provability in one theory with provability in the other (they can be applied only if there are no open assumptions).
ÊÙÔ Ö establishes the completeness of the metatheory with respect the object theory, Ê Û Ö , the correctness. All the reflection up rules establish some form of completeness, while all the reflection down rules establish some form of correctness. The unrestricted rules link derivability in one theory with provability in the other. The negative rules link the holding of a formula of form with with the holding of ¯ µ.
The formal notion
For the rest of the paper we make the following simplifying hypotheses: Ä Ç and Ä Å are propositional and Ä Å is a propositional metalanguage of Ä Ç . (In Section 6.4 we show how the result in the propositional case can be generalized to more complex cases.) Propositional metalanguage is defined as follows.
DEFINITION 2.1 (Propositional metalanguage)
Given a logical language Ä, its propositional metalanguage is the propositional languagē´ Ä µ, whose set of atomic wffs is the set ¯´ µ ¾ Ä .
DEFINITION 2.2 (OM pair)
An Object-Meta Pair (OM pair) is a triple Ç Å ´ÊÊµ where Ç Ä Ç ª Ç ¡ Ç , Å Ä Å ª Å ¡ Å , Ä Å contains the propositional metalanguage of Ä Ç , and´ÊÊµ is a set of reflection rules.
Given an object theory Ç, a metatheory Å, and a set of reflection rules´ÊÊµ, we say that ÇÅ Ç Å ´ÊÊµ is the OM pair composed of Ç and Å connected by´ÊÊµ. Notationally, when it contains more than one bridge rule we represent´ÊÊµ by listing its elements separated by a ·. One example of´ÊÊµ is ÊÙÔ · Ê Û Ò . We suppose that ¡ Ç and ¡ Å contain the rules for classical propositional logic, as defined in [30] .
An Object-Meta pair defines a derivability relation between multiple languages, which is a generalization of the usual single language consequence relation. A detailed definition of multilanguage derivability relation is given in [31] . In the following we give such a definition only for OM pairs. Roughly, the derivability relation defined by an OM pair is the transitive closure of the derivability relation of the object theory ( O ) and of the derivability relation of the metatheory ( M ) under the reflection rules. It is worth noticing that we must keep distinct the formulas of the object theory from those of the meta theory. We therefore assume that formulas are implicitly labelled by the language they belong to, and that the inference rules ¡ Ç and in ¡ Å are applicable only to formulas in the corresponding language. In most of the previous work (see for instance [17, 31] ), the labeling is explicit. Thus, for instance, conjunction introduction in ¡ Ç , conjunction introduction in ¡ Å , and ÊÙÔ would be written, respectively, as
Since we are considering only two theories, the context will always make clear the language a formula belongs to. Formulas containing¯are assumed to be in Ä Å , while formulas with no¯are assumed to be in Ä Ç , unless explicitly stated to the contrary. Figure 1 ).
Meaningful OM pairs
The main objective of this paper is to characterize the object theory and the metatheory generated by any combinations of reflection rules. To keep the presentation reasonably short, we consider only some combinations of meaningful reflection rules. The selection criteria of the group of reflection rules to be analysed is the following.
We first concentrate on the positive rules (mainly used in the literature). The duality results in Section 5 allow us to extend the results to OM pairs mainly involving negative rules.
We do not consider combinations of reflection rules that go in the same direction (either from Ç to Å or in the opposite direction). For instance we do not consider ÊÙÔ ·ÊÙÔ Ò Ö .
The results about these combinations can be obtained by composing the results of the single reflection rules.
We do not consider combinations of reflection rules which are deductively equivalent to some other combination already considered. For instance we do not consider ÊÙÔ · Ê Û · Ê Û Ò as it is deductively equivalent to ÊÙÔ · Ê Û. (It can be easily shown that Ê Û Ò is a derived inference rule when we have ÊÙÔ · Ê Û.)
Finally we do not consider those combinations of reflection rules in which the reflection down rules are 'more restricted' than the reflection up rules. In other words we require that if there is a restricted reflection down then all the reflection up rules must be restricted. The remaining combinations of reflection rules are:
In each section we first concentrate on the combinations labelled with *. At the end of each section we describe how the results can be extended to the other combinations.
A relative characterization
A first characterization of the different combinations of reflection rules can be obtained by comparing them. Any pair of combinations of reflection rules is compared according to the following three criteria:
1. the provability relation of the object theory, namely ÌÀ ÇÅ´Ç µ; 2. the provability relation of the metatheory, namely ÌÀ ÇÅ´Å µ; and 3. the OM derivability relation OM .
The main result of this section is a partial order of the combinations of reflection rules. This partial order is a lattice with top element ÊÙÔ · Ê Û · ÊÙÔ Ò Ö , the strongest combination, and a bottom element , the weakest combination. The orders defined above are not completely independent of one another. For instance, if two combinations of reflection rules are equivalent (i.e.´ÊÊµ ½ ´ÊÊµ ¾ ) then they generate the same object theory and the same metatheory (i.e.´ÊÊµ ½ Ç´Ê Êµ ¾ and´ÊÊµ ½ Ǻ ÊÊµ ¾ ). The relations among the three orders are summarized in Figure 2 . In this figure, an arrow connects to , if and only if´ÊÊµ ½ ´ÊÊµ ¾ implies´ÊÊµ ½ ´ÊÊµ ¾ . Thus, for instance, Figure 2 states that, if´ÊÊµ ½ ´ÊÊµ ¾ , then´ÊÊµ ½ Ç´Ê Êµ ¾ and´ÊÊµ ½ Ǻ ÊÊµ ¾ .
The relations among sets of reflection rules are represented in Figure 3 . 
2.
Ç ÊÙÔ Ö Ç ÊÙÔ. Ç ÊÙÔ Ö Ç ÊÙÔ is a consequence of item (1) of this proof. Vice versa ÊÙÔ Ç ÊÙÔ Ö Ç holds since in OM pairs with only reflection up all the proofs of object theorems do not contain applications of reflection rules.
3.
Å Ê Û Ö Å Ê Û. The proof is analogous to that of item (2). 4. ÊÙÔ Ö Å ÊÙÔ. This statement holds since in the OM pairs with a single reflection up, the premisses of any application of a reflection up in a proof (with no undischarged assumptions) cannot depend upon any assumption on Ç. In fact there is no reflection down that allows one to switch back into Ç to discharge such assumptions. 5. Ê Û Ö Ç Ê Û. The proof is analogous to that of item (4) .
The converse is proved in Proposition 3.7.
is a consequence of Item 1. The converse is a consequence of Proposition 3.7.
9. ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û · ÊÙÔ Ò Ö Ç ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û · ÊÙÔ Ò is a consequence of item (8) of this proof and of Proposition 3.8. Indeed, by item (8), we have that the two sets of reflection rules generate the same metatheory. Furthermore, they both contain ÊÙÔ Ö and Ê Û Ö . As a consequence, by Proposition 3.8, we can infer that they generate the same object theory.
11. ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û · Ê Û Ò Ç ÊÙÔ·Ê Û can be proved from item (10) and Proposition 3.8
and by reasoning as in item (9).
12. ÊÙÔ · Ê Û Ç ÊÙÔ · Ê Û · ÊÙÔ Ò Ö can be proved by reasoning as in Proposition 3.6. PROOF. To prove item (1), we show that Ê Û Ò is a derived reflection rule in ÊÙÔ · Ê Û, namely, we provide a deduction of from ¯ µ using ÊÙÔ · Ê Û.
To prove item (2) we show that ÊÙÔ Ò is a derived reflection rule in ÊÙÔ · Ê Û · ÊÙÔ Ò Ö , namely, we provide a deduction of ¯ µ form using
Item (3) is a consequence of items (1), (2) and Proposition 3.4.
PROOF. Let MK and MC be two OM pairs composed of Ç and Å connected by the reflection rules ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û and ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û · Ê Ù Ô Ò Ö respectively. For each Ä Ç -wff Ç and for each Ä Å -wff Å we have that:
We start by proving (3.1). Let ¥ be a proof of a formula Å of the metatheory of MC containing an application of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö . We transform ¥ into a deduction ¥ ¼ as follows:
Transformation (3.3) replaces the applications of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö by the assumption ¯ µ. Any assumption discharged in the deduction on the left side of (3.3) is also discharged in the deduction on the right side of (3.3). By applying (3.3) to all the occurrences of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö of ¥, we obtain a deduction of Å from ¯ µ which does not contain any application of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö . This is therefore a deduction of Å from ¯ µ in MK. Property (3.2) is proved as follows. Let ¥ be a proof of Ç in MC. If ¥ contains no applications of Ê Û, then it contains no applications of reflection rules, and Ç ¾ ÌÀ´Çµ. Hence Ç is provable in MK too. If it contains an application of Ê Û, then ¥ must be of the form: 
Ê Û
From the fact that all s are theorems of the object theory of MK and that Ç is derivable from ½ Ò , we conclude that Ç is provable in the object theory of MK.
PROOF. We show how to replace every application of ÊÙÔ Ò with an application of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö in the proofs of metatheorems. Let Å be a metatheorem and let ¥ be a proof Å . Suppose that ¥ contains an application of ÊÙÔ Ò which is not an application of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö (i.e. the premiss depends on a not empty set of assumptions Ç in the object theory). Since in ¥ all the assumptions are discharged, there must be at least an application of Ê Û occurring below the application of ÊÙÔ Ò . This very last application is necessary in order to discharge the assumptions Ç (remember that the conclusion Å does not depend on any assumptions).
¥ is therefore of the following form.
This application of ÊÙÔ Ò can be removed from ¥ by rewriting ¥ as follows:
In Deduction (3.5) the assumptions in Ç are discharged before the occurrence of labelled with´£ µ . This ensures the applicability of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö to this occurrence of . The other application of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö in (3.5) to the occurrence of labelled with´£ £µ is also allowed. Indeed ´££µ in (3.5) depends on¯´ µ plus the assumptions on which ¯ µ depends in (3.4). Any other assumption in (3.4) is discharged in (3.5). Indeed an assumption of (3.4) is made in a ¥ and discharged in a ¥ , with and ½ ¾ ¿ . Deduction (3.5)
maintains the same structure; that is, it is built in such a way that, for any , ¥ occurs below ¥ . Finally the assumption¯´ µ is discharged by an application of I. PROOF. Let ÇÅ ½ and ÇÅ ¾ be two OM pairs composed of Ç and Å connected by´ÊÊµ ½ and´ÊÊµ ¾ , respectively. If is a theorem of the object theory of ÇÅ ½ , then, by ÊÙÔ Ö ,´ µ is a theorem of the metatheory of ÇÅ ½ . The hypothesis ÇÅ ½ Å ÇÅ ¾ implies that¯´ µ is a theorem also of the metatheory of ÇÅ ¾ . Therefore is provable (with an application of Ê Û Ö ) in the object theory of ÇÅ ¾ .
PROOF. Let ÇÅ ½ and ÇÅ ¾ be two OM pairs composed of Ç and Å connected by ÊÙÔ · Ê Û and ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û · Ê Û Ò , respectively. We provide a method for transforming a proof
This is done by replacing any assumption in ¥ of a wff of the object language, with suitable assumptions of wffs of the metalanguage and applications of Ê Û Ò .
Let be an assumption of a wff in the object language. Since ¥ is a proof, must be discharged. If is discharged by I, then we apply Transformation (3.6) to ¥. If is discharged by , then we apply Transformation (3.7).
Transformations (3.6) and (3.7) do not introduce undischarged assumptions. Therefore they transform a proof of Å into another proof of Å . By repeatedly applying (3.6) and (3.7)
for each assumption in the object language we obtain a proof ¥ We draw some final remarks on the relations proved in this section. A first remark concerns the rule ÊÙÔ Ò . When¯´ µ can be interpreted as ' is provable in the object theory', (i.e. when the object theory and the metatheory are connected by ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û ) ÊÙÔ Ò corresponds to the assertion of the consistency of the object theory. This correspondence is formally supported, in the proof of Proposition 3.6, by proving that any application of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö can be replaced by the assumption ¯ µ (see transformation (3.7)). Notice however that, differently to what happens in other cases where the object theory is modified by this assertion, Proposition 3.6 shows that the assertion of the consistency of the object theory, either by adding ÊÙÔ Ò or by assuming ¯ µ, does not affect the object theory itself. In our framework, therefore, one can assert the consistency of the object theory in a pure descriptive way. Furthermore notice that, if the metatheory asserts the consistency of the object theory when the object theory is actually inconsistent, then the metatheory will also be inconsistent.
A second remark concerns the asymmetry between the relations ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û Å ÊÙÔ · Ê Û and ÊÙÔ Ò Ö · Ê Û Å ÊÙÔ Ò · Ê Û . In the first case, indeed, relaxing the restriction on the (positive) reflection up strengthens the metatheory; in the second case, instead, such a relaxation leaves the metatheory unchanged. 
An axiomatic characterization
Consider Figure 1 in Section 1; our goal in this section is to axiomatically characterize the effects of the reflection rules on the theorems of Ç and Å. 
Characterization via simple axiom schemata
A first characterization of reflection rules is given in terms of the most common meta-axiom schemata, which have been extensively used in the literature. Examples of such meta axioms are the following:¯´ µ ´¯´ µ ¯ µµ
where must be understood as schematic variables (parameters) ranging over Ä Ç . Axioms of this kind, and in particular the axioms listed above, usually have an intuitive meaning and define (what in our terminology is) the global meta property captured by the corresponding metatheory. Thus (K) states that the interpretation of¯is closed under modus ponens. This is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for¯to be a provability predicate. The axiom (Comp) states that each interpretation of¯is saturated, meaning that for each ¾ Ä ¼ , either or its negation belongs to the interpretation of¯. This is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for¯to be a truth predicate. The axiom (nTbot) states that does not belong to the interpretation of¯. This is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a set of formulas to be consistent. In the following we show how most of the effects of the reflection rules can be characterized by suitable combinations of the above axiom schemata. Table 1 , we have that the metatheory generated by Ê Û and Ê Û Ö is the same as that generated by the empty set of reflection rules, which is ÌÀ´Åµ. This proves (4.2). To prove (4.1) we consider only Ê Û Ö as, from Table 1 , Ê Û Ö and Ê Û generate the same object theory. Notice that the premiss of each application of Ê Û Ö in a proof of an object theorem , must be provable in the metatheory of OM, and, by (4.2), in Å
itself. This implies that, given a proof ¥ of in ÇÅ, the proof of¯´ µ occurring above any application of Ê Û Ö in ¥, can be replaced by , which belongs to¯ ½´ ÌÀ´Åµ µ. Let us now prove ÌÀ ÇÅ´Å µ ÌÀ´Å ·¯´ ÌÀ´Çµ µ · µ. We do this by showing that each application of a reflection rule in a proof of a metatheorem can be replaced by introducing the corresponding axioms. We proceed as follows. In the first step we show how each application of ÊÙÔ can be replaced with a suitable combination of ÊÙÔ Ö , Ê Û and ÓÑÔµ. In the second step we show how each application of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö can be replaced with a suitable combination of ÊÙÔ Ö , Ê Û and´nTbotµ. Finally, we show how the applications of ÊÙÔ Ö and Ê Û can be replaced by axiom´Ãµ and the set of axioms¯´ ÌÀ´Çµ µ. This completes the proof.
Step 1:
ÊÙÔ µ ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û ·´ ÓÑÔµ Let ¥ be a proof of a metatheorem . Suppose that ¥ contains an application of ÊÙÔ whose premiss depends on an assumption in the object theory. Since ¥ is a proof of , must be discharged somewhere in ¥. can be discharged only by an application of E or . In these cases ¥ can be modified as follows: By repeated applications of (4.5) and (4.6) we obtain a proof with no applications of ÊÙÔ.
Step 2:
Step 3:
ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û μ ÌÀ´Çµ µ ·´Ãµ Let be the premiss of the last application of ÊÙÔ Ö in a proof ¥ of a meta formula in ÇÅ. If ¥ does not contain any application of Ê Û, then is a theorem of the object theory and therefore¯´ µ is in¯´ ÌÀ´Çµ µ. This occurrence of ÊÙÔ Ö can be removed from ¥ by deleting the subdeduction above¯´ µ. If ¥ contains an application of Ê Û, let be the consequence of an application of Ê Û such that no application of reflection rules occurs in the thread 2 from to . Then ¥ can be modified as follows:
By repeated applications of (4.8) we can remove all the occurrences of ÊÙÔ Ö and Ê Û. Note that, since the application of reflection up is restricted, then the proof in the left does not contain any undischarged assumption in Ç which is then discharged in ¥ ¾ . Therefore, the above transformation introduces no undischarged assumptions.
The combinations ÊÙÔ Ò Ö · Ê Û and ÊÙÔ Ò · Ê Û require a special treatment. The metatheory generated by these combinations is characterizable by the axiom schema (Cons) To prove (4.9) we observe that if a proof of an object theorem contains some applications of reflection rules, then it is of the following form:
where ¥ Ç is a deduction in Ç. Notice that each¯´ µ is a metatheorem. Indeed¯´ µ cannot depend on any assumptions in the object theory, because the reflection up is restricted. Furthermore,¯´ µ does not depend on any meta assumptions, because does not depend on meta assumption, and ¥ Ç does not discharge any meta assumption. As a consequence is in ÌÀ´Ç ·¯ ½´ ÌÀ ÇÅ´Å µ µµ. The opposite direction is trivial.
Let us prove (4.10). It is easy to see that all the instances of´ ÓÒ×µ are provable via Ê Û · ÊÙÔ Ò Ö . The proof is analogous to the proof of axiom´Ãµ. Let us prove that any theorem in ÌÀ ÇÅ´Å µ can be proved in Å ·´ ÓÒ×µ. As usual we replace the applications of reflection rules with the axiom. Suppose that a deduction ¥ contains an application of ÊÙÔ Ò Ö , then it is of the form:
where ¥ Ç is a proof of in Ç· ½ Ò . As a consequence¯´ ½ µ ¯ Ò µ ¯ µ is an instance of´ ÓÒ×µ, and therefore the applications of the reflection rules can be removed as follows:
To prove (4.11) we need some notation: for each set of wffs Å Ä Å , let´ Å µ Ç be the set ½ Ò Å OM¯´ ½ µ ¯ Ò µ . We prove a more general fact, i.e. that for each set of Ä Ç wffs Ç Ç and for each set of Ä Å wffs Å ,
We proceed by induction on the complexity of a deduction ¥ of Ç from Ç Å . The cases in which ¥ is an assumption, an axiom or it ends with an application of a classical rule are trivial. Suppose that ¥ ends with an application of Ê Û. Then ¥ is of the form: 
This concludes the proof of (4.11).
Finally, (4.12) is a consequence of (4.10), and of the fact that ÊÙÔ Ò · Ê Û Å ÊÙÔ Ò Ö · Ê Û (line 7 and column 13 of Table 1 ).
Fixpoint characterization
The methodology presented in Section 4.1 is rather ad hoc. There are no general criteria which can guide the choice of suitable axiom schemata. Indeed there are no special reasons, apart from their common use, for choosing´Ãµ,´nTbotµ,´ ÓÑÔµ, and others. This method, furthermore, is not exhaustive, as there are combinations of reflection rules, such as, for instance, ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û Ö , which have not been characterized. Our goal, in this subsection, is to provide a general methodology for characterizing ÌÀ ÇÅ´Ç µ and ÌÀ ÇÅ´Å µ. The idea is to consider a set of reflection rules as an operator on pairs of object theory and metatheory. The operator associated to the set of reflection rules´ÊÊµ extends the object theory by applying the reflection down rules of´ÊÊµ to the theorems of the metatheory, and the metatheory by applying the reflection up rules of´ÊÊµ to the theorems of the object theory.
The set of object theorems and the set of the metatheorems of an OM pair composed of Ç and Å connected by´ÊÊµ can be expressed, therefore, as the minimal fixpoint of the operator associated to´ÊÊµ that contains ÌÀ´Çµ and ÌÀ´Åµ.
We start by considering the combination ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û Ö . We successively generalize this method to any set of reflection rules. Given a reflection rule , and a set of wffs Restricted reflection rules confine the effect of the assumptions in a single theory. This means, for instance, that the assumptions done in the object theory do not add any theorem in the metatheory. Formally this corresponds to properties (4.23) and (4.24).
The former property holds for OM pairs with restricted reflection down rules, while the latter holds for OM pairs with restricted reflection up rules. Unrestricted reflection rules, instead, make it possible for assumptions in a theory to affect provability in the other theory. For instance, the assumption¯´ Ô µ in the metatheory, forces Ô, and all its logical consequences, to be theorems in the object theory. Unrestricted reflection rules enable hypothetical reasoning, either on the object theory, or on the metatheory. An example of hypothetical reasoning on the object theory is the following: assume¯´ Ô µ in the metatheory, by unrestricted reflection down, infer Ô, then, by reasoning in the object theory, infer Ô Ô, and by reflection up, conclude¯´ Ô Ô µ in the metatheory. By means of this reasoning we have proved the implication¯´ Ô µ ¯ Ô Ô µ. The characterization of the unrestricted reflection rules is based on the intuition that unrestricted reflection rules can be simulated by restricted reflection rules plus the implication theorems provable by hypothetical reasoning. This intuition allows us to generalize Theorem 4.5 to any set of reflection rules.
Let us introduce some new notation. For any set of reflection rule´ÊÊµ,´ÊÊÙÔ Ù µ denotes the set of unrestricted reflection up of´ÊÊµ, while´ÊÊ Û Ù µ denotes the set of unrestricted reflection down of´ÊÊµ. For any OM pair let us define À Ç and À Å , as the sets of theorems provable in Ç and in Å respectively, by hypothetical reasoning. Let ÇÅ be an OM pair composed of Ç and Å connected by a set of reflection rules´ÊÊµ. ÌÀ ÇÅ´Ç µ and ÌÀ ÇÅ´Å µ are the smallest sets of wffs which satisfy the following fixpoint equations:
If´ÊÊ Û Ù µ is empty, then À Å is propositionally equivalent to´ÊÊÙÔµ´ÌÀ´Çµµ, and if´ÊÊÙÔ Ù µ is empty, then À Ç is propositionally equivalent to´ÊÊ Ûµ´ÌÀ´Åµµ. With restricted reflection rules, therefore, Theorem 4.6 reduces to Theorem 4.5.
PROOF. To prove Theorem 4.6 it is enough to show that any occurrence of an unrestricted reflection rule in a proof can be replaced by some form of hypothetical reasoning: we show the case of ÊÙÔ; all the other cases are analogous. Let ¥ be a proof containing an application of ÊÙÔ. Suppose that the premiss of ÊÙÔ depends on some set of assumptions in the object theory. Being ¥ a proof, we have that there must be an application of a reflection down occurring below that of the ÊÙÔ, which is necessary to discharge the assumptions. This implies that ¥ is of the following form: 
Schematic vs. fixpoint characterizations
Beside being uniform and general, the fixpoint methodology allows us to characterizes the behaviour of a certain set of reflection rules which are not characterizable via schematic characterization. To state this formally, we have to better qualify the notion of schematic characterization. Let È ½ È ¾ be an infinite set of propositional parameters contained in Ä ¼ . Each È is not a simple propositional letter, but it must be intended as a propositional variable ranging over Ä Ç formulas. A schematic formula is a formula in the language of the The literature contains many approaches where a metatheory is defined in terms of schematic formulas. For instance, in metalogic programming [22] , metainterpreters are very similar to the schematic formula´Ãµ; in provability logic [32] From the proof of Theorem 4.9, we conclude that there does not exist an axiom schema which characterizes the metatheories generated by ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û Ö . Notice that the metatheory generated by ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û Ö is very important. First because it is the most used and quoted.
Second, because it is the minimal metatheory which is sound and complete for provability in the object theory, that is, it is the smallest Å such that it is in the relation ' Å theorem´ µ iff Ç ' with Ç. The metatheory generated by ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û Ö · Ê Û Ò Ö is interesting because it is the smallest metatheory for provability extended with a negation as failure rule such as: "if in the metatheory it is provable that is not a theorem, then is a theorem". Table 2 summarizes the results presented in this section.
Duality
Duality principles usually state the preservation of certain logical properties, e.g. provability or satisfiability, under appropriate syntactic transformations on formulas. Examples of duality principles for propositional logic and modal logic can be found in [23] and [11] respectively. The results provided in the previous sections mainly concern provability and derivability in OM pairs. In order to extend these results we define a duality principle that preserves derivability. According to this principle: An important property of dualization is that the dual of the dual of an entity (formula, OM pair) is the entity itself (or equivalent, giving some appropriate notion of equivalence). To satisfy this requirement, if is of the form¯´ µ,¯´ µ must be equivalent to ¯ µ, which is dual´dual´ µµ. This is not true in all OM pairs. We therefore restrict ourselves to only those OM pairs which satisfy the following property:
if a formula is derivable in an OM pair from a set of assumptions, then the dual formula is derivable in the dual OM pair from the dual set of assumptions
We call the OM pairs which satisfy Condition (5.1), classical.
DEFINITION 5.3 (Dual OM pair)
If ÇÅ Ç Å ´ÊÊµ is a classical OM pair, then the dual of ÇÅ, is the OM pair dual´ÇÅµ Ç dual´Å µ dual´´ÊÊµµ , where, dual´Å µ, is the theory obtained by substituting the axioms ª Å of Å with dual´ª Å µ and by adding¯´ µ ¯ µ.
In the definition of dual OM pair, we force dual´ÇÅµ to be classical by explicitly adding the axiom schema¯´ µ ¯´ µ. In many cases this is not necessary, e.g. for the OM pairs with reflection rules stronger or equal to ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û . There are cases, however, where ÇÅ is classical but dual´ÇÅµ is not. This is made clearer by observing that the dual of¯´ µ ¯ µ is ¯ µ ¯ µ which is equivalent to¯´ µ ¯´ µ, but which is not equivalent to¯´ µ ¯´ µ.
LEMMA 5.4
Let ÇÅ be a classical OM pair, Then: (2) is a direct consequence of (1).
THEOREM 5.5 (Duality preserves derivability)
Let ÇÅ be a classical OM pair, Ç Ç and Å Å be a set of object wffs and a set of meta wffs respectively. Then
PROOF. For the proof of the left-to-right direction we proceed by induction on the complexity of the deductions in ÇÅ. Base case If ¥ is the assumption Ç , then it belongs to Ç ; if ¥ is the axiom Ç , then Ç is also an axiom of dual´ÇÅµ. In both cases the right side of (5.2) holds. If ¥ is the assumption Å , then it belongs to Å . Since dual´ Å µ belongs to dual´ Å µ the right side of (5.3) holds. If ¥ is the axiom Å , then dual´ Å µ is an axiom of dual´ÇÅµ. This implies the right side of (5.3).
Step case Let us consider the case of I in the meta theory. The cases of introduction and elimination of the other connectives both in the object theory and in the metatheory are similar. If ¥ ends with an application of I in the meta theory, then it is of the form:
By applying the induction hypothesis to ¥ ¼ we obtain that: 
To prove the right-to-left direction of Theorem 5.5, we apply the left-to-right direction of the same theorem to dual´ÇÅµ obtaining the following:
By Lemma 5.4 we have that dual´dual´ÇÅµµ is equivalent to ÇÅ. Since ÇÅ is classical, dual´dual´ Å µµ is equivalent in ÇÅ to Å , dual´dual´ Å µµ is equivalent to Å . We can therefore conclude that: PROOF. To prove Theorem 5.6 it is sufficient to prove that if´ÊÊµ
then´ÊÊµ generates a classical OM pair. In other words, we prove that the combination ÊÙÔ Ò Ö · Ê Û Ò generates a classical OM pair. A proof of¯´ µ ¯ µ in an OM pair generated by ÊÙÔ Ò Ö · Ê Û Ò is the following:
We can therefore expand Table 2 , by adding the proof theoretic characterization of the theories generated by dual reflection rules shown in Table 3 .
An intuitive interpretation of dual´´Ãµµ, dual´ ÓÑÔµ, and dual´nTbotµ is possible in terms of consistency. Notice that consistency is the dual concept of provability, and that´Ãµ, nTbotµ and´ ÓÑÔµ can be interpreted in terms of provability. The axiom schema dual´´Ãµµ is equivalent to¯´ µ ´ ¯ µ ¯ µµ ´Ã Ò µ Reading¯´ µ as ' is consistent with the object theory', the instantiation of´Ã Ò µ with to states that 'If the object theory is consistent and is inconsistent with it, then is consistent with the object theory'. The axiom schema dual´´nTbotµµ is equivalent to:´ µ´nTbot Ò μ nTbot Ò µ can be read as ' is consistent with the object theory', which is equivalent to saying that the object theory is consistent. Finally dual´´ ÓÑÔµµ is equivalent tō´ µ ¯ µ´ ÓÑÔ Ò µ which is equal to´ ÓÑÔµ and can be read as 'either or is consistent with the object theory'.
Case studies
The results obtained in the previous sections can be specialized to various subclasses of metatheories. In particular we consider the class of OM pairs with an empty metatheory (i.e., a metatheory with no axioms), the class of OM pairs with a Horn metatheory (i.e., a metatheory whose axioms are Horn clauses), the class of OM pairs where the object and metatheories are amalgamated, and finally the class of OM pairs with first-order theories.
Empty metatheory
In an OM pair with an empty metatheory (i.e. if ª Å ), all the theorems in ÌÀ ÇÅ´Å µ which are not tautologies, are generated by applying a set of reflection rules to the theorems of the object theory. The metatheory is therefore completely generated by the object theory via reflection rules. This class of OM pairs corresponds to those approaches to meta reasoning where the metatheory is defined on the basis of some object theory. In these approaches, the resulting metatheory is proved to be correct and/or complete with respect to the original object theory. In OM pairs, reflection rules guarantee that the metatheory generated in the OM pair is correct and/or complete with respect to ÌÀ ÇÅ´Ç µ, but not with respect to the original object theory ÌÀ´Çµ. To show the correspondence between the generative approach described above and OM pairs with empty metatheory, we have to prove that, when the metatheory is empty, ÌÀ ÇÅ´Ç µ Ì À Çµ.
Let ÇÅ be an OM pair composed of Ç and an empty metatheory Å, connected by any set of reflection rules. Then for any set of object wffs ¦ :
where, if ¦ is the empty set, then Ï ¦ and Ï¯´ ¦ µ are equal to .
PROOF. For any deduction ¥ in ÇÅ, let ¥ Ç be the formula tree obtained by replacing each occurrence of¯´ µ in ¥ with , and by removing the consequences of all the applications of the reflection rules. By induction on the structure of ¥ we can prove that, if ¥ is a deduction of from , than ¥ Ç is a deduction of Ç from Ç , where Ç and Ç are obtained by performing the same process as in ¥ Ç (see [31] for a detailed proof of this fact). Let ¥ be a deduction of in ÇÅ from¯´ µ and ¯ ¦ µ. ¥ Ç is a deduction of from and ¦. This proves (1) . (2) can be proved in the same way. Let ¥ be a deduction of from in ÇÅ. Then ¥ Ç is also a deduction of from . Since it does not contain any occurrence of formulas of the metalanguage then ¥ Ç is a deduction in Ç. Therefore we can conclude that O .
A consequence of Theorem 6.1 is that, for any pair of combinations of reflection ruleś
ÊÊµ ½ and´ÊÊµ ¾ , we have that´ÊÊµ ½ Ç´Ê Êµ ¾ Ç . A second consequence is that restricted reflection down rules are redundant. More precisely Ê Û Ö and Ê Û Ò Ö are admissible rules in any OM pair with an empty metatheory.
Horn metatheory
We say that Å is a horn metatheory when its axioms are horn formulas of the following form:
with Ñ Ò ¼, and Ô an atomic formula which is not of the form¯´ µ. To prove ÇÅ ¼ Ç ÇÅ, it is sufficient to show that any application of the inference rule ´ ¾µ , can be replaced by deduction in ÇÅ, that uses ÊÙÔ Ö , the meta axiom (6.2) and Ê Û Ö .
The proofs of the other cases are trivial as we can exploit the schematic characterization of
Å.
The previous theorem states that any object theory can be specified by a Horn metatheory. For the purpose of object theory specification, Horn metatheories have usually been studied in the literature. See, for instance, [24] in the area of metalogic programming, [5] in the area of metalogical framework, and the FOL metatheory as described in [36, 19] . Many of the ideas and results which have been developed in these approaches, can be reproduced in the OM pair framework. Consider for instance the meta predicate ÑÓ Ä , as defined in [24] for some object level logic Ä. demo Ä is extensionally equivalent to the predicate¯of the metatheory of the OM pair composed of Ä and an empty metatheory connected by ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û . That is, given a program P and its meta program MP, any ground formula is provable in MP if and only if the corresponding formula demō is provable in the metatheory of ÇÅ (where demō stands for the formula in which all its atomic subformulas demo´ µ are substituted with¯´ µ).
Amalgamated object and metatheory theory
In OM pairs the object theory and the metatheory are kept distinct, but there is a lot of work in which the metatheory is either embedded or the same as the object theory. These situations are usually addressed as amalgamating object and metatheory. Here we show how amalgamated object and metatheory can be reconstructed in OM pairs.
Consider for instance the work in [8] . µ is an atomic ground wff.
Requirement 2 states that the provability relation of the object theory is the same as the provability relation of the metatheory. Following our approach, we impose this constraint via rules which work between Ç and Å. Intuitively we need a rule which exports theorems from the object theory to the metatheory and another which works in the opposite direction.
Since object and metatheory have the same language, to keep things distinct, from now on we write Ç or Å depending on whether ¾ Ä Ç or ¾ Ä Å . The rules which impose Requirement 2 are the following.
2.
Ç Å
Both rules can be applied whenever their premisses does not depend on assumptions in the same theory.
As far as we can see, many of the forms of amalgamation which can be found in the literature can be reproduced in the OM pair framework by using suitable combinations of reflection rules, (O M) Ö and (M O) Ö . As an example, consider the rule of reflection down of the amalgamated system described in [1] :
Let ÇÅbe an OM pair composed of an empty first-order object theory and an empty firstorder metatheory, both theories using the same language Ä. Let the reflection rules of ÇÅ be ÊÙÔ Ö , Ê Û, 
First-order OM pairs
An interesting case, which is widely studied in the literature, is that of a first-order metatheory for a first order object theory. Let us see how OM pairs and the results of this paper can be applied to this case. Analogously to the propositional case, we suppose that the inference rules ¡ Ç and ¡ Å are the set of inference rules for First-Order Natural Deduction (the system defined in [30] ).
Most of the results of this paper are independent of the specific inference machineries ¡ Ç and ¡ Å . They are, therefore, applicable to FOL OM pairs. The theorems that hold also for FOL OM pairs are the following: Notice that, all the main results proved for the propositional case are extendable to the firstorder case.
Related work
Reflection principles in formal logics
The ideas described in this paper are complementary to the large amount of work on reflection principles started by Feferman with his seminal work [12] and still under development in the field of formal logic [6] . Most of the reflection principles studied in logics are stated inside a single theory; they are variations of the following formula schema:
4 Ü ÈÖÓÚ´ ´ Üµ µ ´Üµ
It is well known that extending an expressive theory (e.g. Peano Arithmetic) with (7.1) and (7.2) leads to inconsistency. This means that any consistent theory cannot prove a full reflection principle for itself. Most of the research in the area of formal logic principles has focused on studying how to define consistent theories that satisfy some restricted versions of (7.1) and (7.2) . In many cases the weakening is based on syntactic restrictions on ´Üµ. Many results proved in this paper, as for instance the partial order described in Section 3, can be easily generalized, Other results can be obtained by instantiating the general formalism for bridge rules with free variables called DFOL, developed in [13] .
Metalogic programming
Most of the approaches to Metalogic Programming (MLP) are based on the following common idea: 'Given a logic program Ç, called object program, and a property È of this program (e.g., provability), build another program Å, called the metaprogram, so that Å correctly represents È.' Examples of these approaches are described in [8, 22, 3, 25] . The approach described in [10] can be seen as a generalization of this class, as Brogi and Turini consider a metaprogram that reasons about a set of object programs, and about all the object programs that can be obtained by composing them. To reach this goal one has to perform three main steps: first, define the metalanguage in which it is possible to speak about the program Ç and the property È; second, generate the metaprogram Å in the metalanguage that describes Ç; third, prove the fact that Å correctly represents the property È of Ç. The analogy between OM pairs and MLP is strong. Indeed the object program and metaprogram correspond to object theory and metatheory, the encoding function corresponds to the naming function , and the reflection principles (either in the form (7.4) and (7.5), or in the form (7.7) and (7.6)) correspond to reflection rules. However, the methodology and the final goal of MLP and of OM pairs are quite different. Indeed in MLP the starting point is an object program and the metaprogram describes some of its properties without modifying it 6 (see for instance [22] Section 4.2). In OM pairs, instead, the starting point is constituted by a partial specification of the object and the metatheory and a reflection principle formalized by a set of reflection rules; the result is the minimal object theory and metatheory satisfying the initial partial specifications and the reflection principle. In OM pairs, as shown by Theorem 6.1, when the starting metatheory is empty, the resulting metatheory describes the starting object theory without modifying it, as happens in MLP. In more detail, let us compare MLP and OM pairs on the basis of their components.
Metalanguage
In MLP, the metalanguage is usually composed of quantifier-free-first order clauses, while the OM pairs studied in this paper adopt a propositional metalanguage. This is, of course, a limitation, however, in Section 6.4 we have shown how most of the results proved for propositional OM pairs can be extended to FOL OM pairs. 5 There are two alternative ways to represent expressions in the metalanguage: the ground representation and the non-ground representation [22] . In the first does not contains variables, in the second contains the same variables occurring in . 6 A notably different approach, which is more in the generative spirit of OM pairs, is that by Subrahmanian, described in [33] , and summarized in [29] . In this approach the metaprogram does not speak about any specific object program, so there is no necessity to prove its correctness. Metaprograms allow for the definition of metapredicates via a set of clauses. An example of such clauses are the following [33, 29] :
where Î is a variable that stands for any set of literals. Clauses such as (7.6) define an object predicate in terms of some metaproperty (provability in this case), while clauses such as (7.7) defines the metapredicate in terms of object properties. The goal of this approach is not to prove that the metatheory satisfies a set of reflection principles, as they are explicitly stated in the theory. The goal is rather to adapt the semantics of logic programming to the new statements like (7.6) and (7.7).
Object and metaprograms (theories)
In MLP, object programs and meta programs can be separated or amalgamated (in this latter case object origrans and metaprograms are embedded in a single logic program). In the first case there is no formal connection between the two programs. The relation between them, i.e. the reflection principles (7.4) and (7.5) , is stated in the informal external theory that describes the system (see for instance Theorem 2.2.1 and Theorem 2.2.2 in [22] ). In some cases reflection principles are implemented by a set of 'improper' inference rules, which do not belong to a formal system, but which are shortcuts, useful for simplifying reasoning. Such rules do not add any new theorem to the system. The paradigmatic examples of such rules are the following:
In the amalgamated approach the object program is embedded in the metaprogram. In this case it is possible to formalize the reflection principles in the amalgamated program. This is done by a set of 'hybrid' clauses, which contain formulas of the object language and the metalanguage, as those shown in (7.6) and (7.7).
In OM pairs, object and metatheory are kept separated as in the non-amalgamated approach. Nevertheless the amalgamated approach is also representable in OM pair by the rules (O M) Ö and (M O) Ö , as described in Section 6. OM pairs, however, allow the 'improper' inference rules (7.8) to be part of the formalism. Indeed OM pair are based on Multi Context Systems [14, 31] , a formal framework which allows us to cope with rules across different theories. From Multi Context System we can borrow the semantics for such rules [16] , and we can compare different reflection principles in a well founded formalism, as we have done in this paper.
Metaprogram (theory) generation
In the non-amalgamated approach the metatheory is defined only informally for any object program. The metaprogram generation is not part of the logic. Examples of metaprograms generated in such a way are the Vanilla Meta Interpreter, the Proof Tree Meta Interpreter, the Instance-Demo Program and the SLD-Demo Program (see [22] for a survey of these programs). For each of these metaprograms it is necessary to prove the reflection principle. This proof, however, often does not guarantee minimality, that is, the metaprogram generated is in general not the minimal metaprogram that satisfies the reflection principle. This is the case, for instance, of the Vanilla Meta Interpreter which is not the minimal program that satisfies the reflection principle 7.4. As observed in [25] , in certain situations non-minimality can constitute a problem.
In OM pairs, instead, we proceed in the opposite direction: the desired reflection principles are imposed by a set of logical rules which generate the minimal metatheory satisfying them. OM pairs constitute a simple solution to the problem raised in [25] , as the minimal metatheory satisfying (7.4) and (7.5) can be obtained simply by the reflection rules ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û Ö . As shown in Section 3, this metatheory is weaker than that generated by ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û equivalent to the Vanilla Meta Interpreter.
In MLP there are some approaches that, due to their great similarity with OM pairs, demand a specific discussion. This is the case of the approaches which use reflection principles in a more generative way. A paradigmatic example of this class is the work of Brogi et al. described in [10] , and that of Barklund et al. described in [4] .
In [10] the metatheory formalizes provability of a set of primitive object programs in the usual way (i.e. via the Vanilla Meta Interpreter). The metatheory formalizes how composite programs can be built from primitive programs with a set of operators (i.e. , , etc.) An example of the axioms contained in the metatheory are: demo´Ü Ý Þ Ûµ demo´Ü Þ Ûµ (7.9) demo´Ü Ý Þ Ûµ demo´Ý Þ Ûµ (7.10) In this case the reflection principle is exploited in a generative way to prove theorems in composite object programs. In terms of reflection rules, this approach can be represented with an extension of OM pairs composed of a set of 'primitive' object theories, which are connected with a ÊÙÔ Ö to the metatheory, and a set of 'composite' object theories which are connected to the metatheory with a Ê Û. The results about OM pairs (and the other set of bridge rules) developed in this paper can be applied to this approach by generalizing composition of programs not only on the basis of provability but also on the basis of other properties such as consistency and truth. For instance we might be interested in defining a composite program È which proves the theorems of another program È ½ and the formulas which are consistent with the program È ¾ .
In [4] inference rules similar to reflection rules are fully exploited for the generation of the object theory and the metatheory in the same spirit of OM pairs. Barklund introduces the concept of theory system as a collection of interdependent theories, some of which stand in a object/meta relation, forming an arbitrary number of metalevels. The language of theory systems contains formulas of the form: Ø which stands for is provable in the theory Ø. In the formalism of OM pairs Ø corresponds to¯´ µ in the metatheory, where the object theory term Ø is left implicit.
The inference machinery of theory systems is a labelled refutation system in which resolution and reduction ad absurdum can be applied inside each theory. For every theory, with names Ø ½ and Ø ¾ , there is a theory Ø ½ AEØ ¾ that represents how the theory Ø ¾ is seen by the theory Ø ½ . In other words the theory Ø ½ acts as the metatheory for the theory Ø ½ AE Ø ¾ . The rules which connect theories with metatheories are syntactic variations of ÊÙÔ Ö and Ê Û Ö and look as follows: TD Ø ½ Ø ¾ Ø ½ AE Ø ¾ TU Ø ½ AE Ø ¾ Ø ½ Ø ¾ In the theory Ø ½ it is possible to represents provability in Ø ½ AEØ ¾ by the metapredicate Ø ¾ Ü (where Ü stands for the unquoted variable Ü). [4] provides a semantics but does not provide a soundness and completeness result.
On the one hand it is clear that the formalism of OM pairs is representationally weaker than theory systems, since OM pairs consider only two theories. The advantage of this simple structure, however, is that we concentrate only on the aspects about the possible object/meta relations. On the other hand the results about OM pairs seem general enough to be extended to any pair of theories embedded in a more complex structure such as theory systems.
Weyhrauch's metatheory in ÇÄ
In OM pairs, it is possible to formalize the reflective reasoning described by Weyhrauch in [36] and implemented in the proof checking system ÇÄ [35, 34] and in its evolution Ì ÇÄ [15, 7] . ÇÄ provides a way of reasoning via reflection principles between an object and a metatheory by the command Ê Ä Ì. Consider for instance the ÇÄ command executed in the object theory: ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ Ê Ä Ì Å Ç ½ Ç ¾ (7.11) where Å is the fact of the metatheory containing the theorem Ø Ñ ½ Ø Ñ ¾ ÌÀ ÇÊ Å´Ñ Ò ´Ø Ñ ½ Ø Ñ ¾ µµ and Ç ½ Ç ¾ are two facts of the object theory asserting two theorems, say ½ and ¾ . As described in [36, 18] , the execution of command (7.11) generates a new fact in the object theory that is the evaluation of the function Ñ Ò to the arguments Ç ½ and Ç ¾ , i.e. a new fact Ç ¿ which asserts that the conjunction ½ ¾ is a theorem of the object theory. ÇÄ reflection principles can be formalized with an OM pair containing ÊÙÔ Ö and Ê Û. For instance (7.11) Let us consider the analogies between deduction (7.12) and the execution of (7.11) in ÇÄ.
The axioms Ç ½ and Ç ¾ correspond to the facts Ç ½ and Ç ¾ respectively. The axiom Å ¯´ ½ µ ¯ ¾ µ ¯´ ½ ¾ µ corresponds to an instance of the metafact Å . Notice that, the variables Ø Ñ ½ and Ø Ñ ¾ of sort theorem in ÇÄ, have been substituted with the preconditions¯´ ½ µ and¯´ ¾ µ. The application of ÊÙÔ Ö corresponds to the bindings of the variables Ø Ñ ½ and Ø Ñ ¾ to the formulas contained in the Ç ½ and Ç ¾ . The application of Ê Û Ö corresponds to the evaluation of the term Ñ Ò ´Ø Ñ ½ Ø Ñ ¾ µ, and the assertion of the results as a theorem in the object theory.
Modal logics
Amalgamated OM pairs have a tight connection with normal modal logics, under the translation of¯´ µ into ¾ . Notice indeed that the proof of the modal axiom K can be obtained by the reflection rules Ê Û · ÊÙÔ Ö (Theorem 4.2), and that the necessitation rule can be obtained by a subsequent application of (M O) Ö and ÊÙÔ Ö . This intuition can be easily proved. (´ ) The if direction is trivial as the translation of necessitation is an admissible rule in OMK, and the translation of K is provable in OMK.
A version of Theorem 7.1 has been proved in [17] . In this paper, however, modal K is proved equivalent to a multi-context system called MBK composed of an infinite set of theories, rather than to the amalgamated OM pair OMK. MBK is a chain-wise hierarchy of theories with a top theory. Each pair of adjacent theories constitutes an OM pair where the theory above is the metatheory, the theory below is the object theory, and they are connected by the reflection rules ÊÙÔ Ö · Ê Û .
Conclusion
The starting point of this paper is the notion of OM pair. OM pairs contain an object theory, a metatheory distinct from the object theory, and a set of reflection rules. Reflection rules allow for the deductive generation of the object and metatheory. This is achieved by exporting consequences from one theory to the other.
The main body of the paper consists of a study of the meta and object theories generated by the various combinations of reflection rules. We have studied the relative strength of the object and metatheories generated by different combinations of bridge rules. We have shown how our approach allows us to define metatheories already studied in the literature, but also others which have not been defined with other approaches. We have defined a duality property. Finally we have studied three important case studies: empty metatheory, Horn metatheory, amalgamated object and metatheory.
All the analysis in this paper is proof theoretical. In a following paper we will perform a semantical analysis. This will give us a new perspective on OM pairs and the formalization of metareasoning, and it will also allow us to strengthen and generalize some of the results presented here.
